

15 November 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director/Intelligence
ATTENTION : Assistant to DD/I (Plans)
SUBJECT : Draft O/NE Annex to DD/I War Plan

1. Attached is our proposed draft annex as requested in your memorandum of 1 July. I also have the following general comments.
2. AD/BI agrees with us that, while each of us produces a form of "national" intelligence, our problems are actually quite dissimilar. Therefore we each propose to submit separate annexes.
3. We also believe paragraph 2b (1) of the draft DD/I plan needs clarification. How long is this "initial phase" supposed to last? Does the strategic concept for this phase mean that only "evaluations of the current situation" will be required? Are these to be exclusively current intelligence in nature or do they include NIE-type evaluations? In almost any type of initial wartime situation we foresee an immediate need for coordinated estimates and believe that the strategic concept should so indicate. Any initial wartime disruption will not affect our capabilities any more than those of the current intelligence people.
4. O/NE depends heavily upon the other IAC agencies in preparation of NIE's. O/NE would oppose any proposed wartime expansion of the role of other DD/I offices which may be at the expense of or conflict with the roles of the IAC agencies. In a situation where many offices or agencies may be bidding for a limited number of competent, experienced people, certain CIA expansion plans may be at the expense of the other IAC agencies. If CIA is to assume or duplicate some of the roles of these agencies in wartime it will affect the sources of O/NE support.
5. Assuming Washington is not attacked immediately upon outbreak of war, it will still be under threat of attack for an indeterminate period. Therefore, should not consideration be given to

immediate establishment of cadres at the relocation center upon D-day, instead of waiting until an evacuation signal is given? If this concept were accepted, it would require some alteration in DD/I plans.

6. Finally, should there not be some general planning assumptions as to possible casualties in the opening round, so that we can make some advance plans on how we would operate with, say, two-thirds losses, almost total losses, etc.? We realize any such assumptions would have to be highly arbitrary but they would provide valuable planning ideas.

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National Estimates